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URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA AND TANZANIA: 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
by 
Richard E. Stren 
ABSTRACT 
Urban housing, land allocation and planning policy is compared 
for Kenya and Tanzania for the post-Independence decade. In both countries, 
performance has fallen short of policy goals, especially in terms of the 
inability to shift development from the centre and the difficulty in 
effecting programmes for the lower income groups. Still, policy in 
Tanzania, while more innovative, and more focused on the needs of lower 
income groups, has been beset by more severe bureaucratic problems of 
implementation tha.. has been the case in Kenya. The two countries' 
policies represent opposite dilemmas in the tension between equity and 
performance, these policy divergences are related more broadly to 
different elite political attitudes and structures, and to different 
patterns of urban income distribution. 
IDS/DP 232 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past ten years, African governments have wrestled with 
the problems of designing and implementing comprehensive rural development 
policies. In an overwhelmingly rural continent with, for most areas, only 
a recent history c:"7 r.rbanization, an emphasis on the priority of rural over 
urban development is understandable. But if African cities are for the 
most part young, and small by world standards, they are also growing faster I 
than cities in any other major world region. This rapid growth, superimposed 
on a meagre resource base, will put increasing pressure on planners to devise 
solutions for the adequate and equitable distribution of urban services. 
The solutions that emerge, however, will be heavily conditioned by two sets 
of factors: the immediate demands of urban growth, and the wider political/ 
administrative and social context within which policy-making takes place. 
In an effort to explain more clearly how these factors operate in contemporary 
Africa, this paper will compare urban policy in Kenya and Tanzania from 
Independence until the end of 1973. Emphasis will be placed on land allocation, 
housing and planning policies which most affect lower income groups in the 
two countries. 
URBAN POLICY AND PERFORMANCE IN KENYA 
Policy 
In the first few years after Indepsr.ier.ee,Kenya did little to define 
an overall urban development policy. The value of private buildings constructed 
in the main towns - a sensitive indicator of economic growth - fell precipitous! 
from £8,082,000 in 1959 to £1,628,000 in 1963, and did not begin to rise 
appreciably again until 1967. (22) At the same time the urban population was 
swelling. From 1948 to 1962, census figures showed an average urban rate of 
growth of 6.3% per annum. Taking the African population of the two largest » 
towns, Nairobi and Mombasa, growth rates were 6.5% and 7.1% respectively (18, 
p.23) compared with an African growth rate of 2.8% for the whole country (18, 
p.82) Between the 1962 and 1969 censuses, the African population in Nairobi 
and Mombasa grew at a compound annual rate of 15.2% and 7.6% (12, p.49); the 
increase in growth for Nairobi was especially high. These growth rr.t-s. in < 
combination with the decline in private building, put tremendous pressure on 
the Government to deal with housing in a more aggressive manner. 
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The Government's first response was to call in the experts. A 
United Nations report published in May, 1965 defined the extent of the housing 
problem and suggested some solutions. As to the extent of the problem, the 
UN mission found the country was experiencing "a serious housing problem", 
especially among the African population. In comparison with housing for other 
races, African housing was a poorer quality and overcrowding was "extreme" 
(2)"*". Machinery to deal with these shortages fell into two categories: 
regulatory and developmental. On the regulatory side, in 1967 new Rent 
Tribunals were set up in the main towns, with powers to control rents cn un-
furnished dwellings with a "standard rent" of shs. 800/- or less. In theory 
these Tribunals (under a revamped Rent Control Act) should have been able to 
regulate all rents in lower- and middle-income housing throughout the country. 
The developmental response, following a suggestion by the UN mission, was to 
establish in the same year a National Housing Corporation (NHC) with powers 
to undertake directly housing projects throughout Kenya as well as to make 
loans to local authorities who would build themselves. The NHC was to be a 
more vigorous descendent of the former Central Housing Board, which needed 
"to have a new image in playing a role which is in keeping with the spirit 
of the new, independent Kenya." (16, col. 773) The Development Plan 1970-1974, 
recognizing "an imperative need to accelerate the creation of inexpensive 
urban housing for the low income groups," (14-, p. 507) went on to stipulate 
that all Government funds given to the NHC would be br houses costing £1200 
or less. (14, p.508) Even at this figure, only 17% of all urban households 
-could afford more expensive housing. (14, p.508) As a gesture ~r> the very 
lowest income groups, however, the Plan also specified that 33-0 of the NHC 
funds allocated would have to be spent on -itssand services schemes rather than 
on conventional housing. Such schemes would provide planned alternatives to 
the "large and expanding illegal squatter areas near the urban centres." (14, 
p.£19)In all these efforts, the central government called for closer coordination 
with local governments (both rural and urban), which "must ... be brought into 
the national development effort, to assist in the formation and implementation 
of economic and social plans." (14, p.179) Finally, in addition to planning for 
the physical growth of Nairobi and Mombasa, the Plan proposed to take "positive 
steps ... to decentralize future urban growth" for seven other towns designated 
as "major growth centres".(14, p.186) After the publication of the Plan, no 
new major urbr.-i policy decisions were announced during the period under review. 
1. Census figures prepared for the Mission showed that in 1962, 70% of 
African urban households occupied a single living room, and 49% of households 
had three or more persons to the room. 
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Performance 
In the first decade of Kenya's Independence, two main biases appear 
in the implementation of urban policy: a disproportionate extension of services 
and benefits to middle and upper income groups, and an emphasis on prestige 
development in Nairobi. 
Table I: National Housing Corporation, Kenya. Units completed and cost, 
1969 - 1972 
Year Site and Service 
Units , Number 
Cost 
£ '000 
Conventional 
Units , number 
Cost 
£ '000 
Total Cost 
£ '000 
1969 48 4 1880 2644 2648 
1970 169 39 2171 2442 2481 
1971 1465 313 1737 1902 2215 
1972 2100 271 2498 442 5 4696 
,Totals 3782 627 8286 11,413 12,040 
Source: Ministry of Housing, 1973. 
The construction programme of the NHC illustrates the first bias 
very clearly. As Table I shows, the NHC spent a total of £11,413,000 on 
8,286 conventional housing units from 1969 to 1972, for an overall average 
cost per unit of £1,377. Thus, as the Plan period was getting underway, the 
average cost of public housing completed was already higher than the maximum 
cost permitted to the NHC in the Plan document itself. Official income figures* 
for 1968 showed that only about 15% of all urban household heads would be 
able to purchase or rent housing at this cost. (14, p.508) 
There is another factor which further narrows the group to whom 
! 
/these benefits accrue. Because rents in Kenya's towns are out of all proportion 
to the value of dwellings rented, tenant-purchase houses are seen as an 
especially lucrative investment. The allocation committees of the municipal 
councils are the focus of intense political pressures, with the result that 
strict adherence to "waiting list" and "points" procedures has often been 
dispensed with. This pattern was duly noted by the National Assembly's Public 
Accounts Committee in its report on county and municipal councils: 
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Another disturbing feature in some of the Councils is that 
the operation of and dealings in Tenant-Purchase Schemes 
and building plots have left much to be desired. Plots appear 
to have been allocated to persons who have then sold or 
transferred them to other people within one year of allotment, 
contrary to the terms and conditions of allotment. More 
than one dwelling-housing plot under different housing 
schemes appear to have been allocated to councillors and 
other prominent persons who have in several cases failed 
to repay their loans regularly. (20, p.5) 
Conventional housing, of course, is not the whole story. As we 
have seen above the Plan clearly recognized that, because of costs, those 
in the lowest income groups could not afford the payments on conventionally 
built houses or flats. The alternative suggested was sites and services schemes, 
in which plots and services are provided by the authorities, and people are 
expected to build their own houses to minimal standards. This approach is 
strongly favoured by the World Bank (See, for example, 58}pp.64-65. ) and the 
United Nations Centre for Housing, Building and Planning. Not surprisingly, 
the Government has dragged its feet in this area: out of a total of £12,040,000 
spent in 1969 - 1972 on all forms of p lib lie housing, only £627,000, or 5% - as 
compared with the Plan target of 33% - was spent on sites and services. The 
NHC claimed recently that such schemes could not work in large towns like 
Nairobi because "the participants had full-time jobs in the city and could 
spare insufficient time to work on the houses themselves." (17, p.20) A pattern 
that appears to be common all over the country is for many lower income plot 
allottees to sell their interest in the site to wealthier people who then 
develop the plots by hiring labour, recouping their capital very quickly in 
high rents. (See, for example 11, p.85) In addition, it is not uncommon for 
councillors, council officials and influential national politicians to secure 
plots in these schemes (often allocated to their relatives) which they in turn 
develop at a profit. In drafting a recent proposal to the World Bank for a 
large sites and services project loan, officers of the Nairobi City Council's 
Planning Department found that one of their most difficult tasks was to set 
up a procedure for the allocation of plots that would be both administratively 
2 effxeient and insulated from political pressures. 
These biases in the implementation of public housing programmes are 
not compensated for in other directions. Although in principle the Rent 
Control Machinery applies to all unfurnished dwellings renting for Shs. 300/-
per month and less (or furnished dwellings up to Shs. 1100/- per month), it is 
The solution arrived at is detailed in (30). 
IDS/DP 232 
- 5 -
not very effective in helping the poor. In squatter areas like Mathare Valley 
in Nairobi, there have been physical threats against rent control officials. 
The rent control machinery has further difficulty in reaching lower income 
groups because of complicated procedures, charges, and the advisability fox1 
a tenant to hire a lawyer to effectively present his case before the Rent 
3 
Tribunal. As for approved housing constructed by the private sector., which 
is approximately equal in value to all housing hi}?-. Jt 1 >ie Oov^ vurn^ T,"C (15, 
p.20), the bulk of this is higher-cost housing beyond the reach of both the 
Rent Restriction Act and lower income groups. 
The typical response to this kind of urban policy ail over the \ 
developing world has been "squatting" in various forms. Kenya is no exception 
to this rule. In 1971, a comprehensive report estimated that one-third of 
14 
Nairobi's population was living in "uncontrolled and illegal housing". (7,p.4-) 
The largest single area was Mathare Valley, where it was estimated that || 
approximately 53,000 people were living in 1972. (See 27, p.8; also partly 
summarized in 3.) In Mombasa, Kenya's second largest town, it is more 
difficult for the authorities to control residential building since much I 
residential land (in contrast to Nairobi) is in private freehold tenure.. In N 
1969, a detailed study estimated that 31% of all residential land was occupied 
by "unplanned temporary" housing (24, p.4) and that 47% of the population of 
+he town (or some 116,000 of a population of 247,073) lived in such housing. 
(24, Appendix A; Section 13) 
Urban officials in Kenya have tried to regulate squatting in two 
main ways. The first is through application of municipal by-laws, which 
require that all plans for building within municipal or city boundaries be 
submitted to the local council for approval. Until 1968 these building standards 
inherited from the colonial period, demanded buildings that cost much more 
than lower income groups could afford. After 1968, however, a new set of 
building (Grade II) by-laws could be applied by local authorities to areas 
they designated, thus permitting much cheaper housing under planned conditions. 
Still, most new squatter housing is beneath even these standards. Effective 
controls through by-laws depend essentially on three factors: a vigilant building 
3. Thj -!•• my interpretation of an interview with the Administrative Officer, 
Rent lYMnVl o.-u Tri buiiy.! , Nairobi, 22 November, 1973. For criticisms of the 
Tribune Id f .-.f-e < ,) and (8) pp. 289-90. 
4, The study cfites a figure of 143.313 persons living in various categories 
of illegal housing. The estimate is probably based on work done 1969. In that 
year, the official census showed Nairobi with a total population of 509,286, of 
which 421,079 were Africans. Since virtually all "pgur<*. i -.'.it" aro Africans, this 
represents 28% of the total population, or 34% r>i l.ln- Airi^-m population. 
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inspectorate with cooperation from the police and Administration; an adequately 
staffed town planning agency; and the political will to demolish structures 
when they do not meet established standards or planning requirements. 
During the colonial period in Nairobi, the Government systematically 
demolished squatter areas within the city boundaries, in many cases not even 
attempting to provide alternative accommodation for those who lost their homes. 
During the Emergency, from 1952 to 1960, these operations were often tied to 
the political objectives of screening possible "subversive" elements (mainly 
Kikuyu, Embu and Meru people) and controlling immigration to the city. When 
the Emergency Regulations were lifted in early 1960, the flood of Kikuyu 
migration from areas neighbouring the city swamped the Administration. Thousand 
of Africans began to trade without licences and to build wherever they could 
^ find land. After the new central government consolidated its power in the 
mid-sixties, there were several large demolitions and "clean-up" campaigns 
aimed, at ridding the central city of squatters. In 1970, the year following 
the last National Assembly elections, the City Council of Nairobi, together 
with the Administration and Police, mounted a massive "City Clean-up Campaign" 
iextending over several months. According to a carefully mapped strategy which 
5 
covered all major squatter areas in the city except Kibera and Mathare Valley, 
Council askaris and police arrived at dawn to surprise the people before 
they left for work, finishing their demolition before lunch. Although there 
was public criticism of this campaign (to which the Council is sensitive) the 
Cabinet supported it (East African Standard, 21 November, 1970) and President 
Kenyatta later told a Council delegation he did not want Nairobi to turn into 
a "shanty-town". (29, pp.2497-98) Since then, the City Council has regularly 
demolished "shanties" along the road reserves and on State and City Council 
land. There is no evidence that the Central Government's recent decision "that 
slum housing ought not to be demolished unless there is some positive and 
overriding developmental reasons for doing so" (21, p.46) has had any effect on 
the Council's demolition policy. 
In spite of the policy of regular demolition, two main areas of 
sub-standard housing have been left alone: Dagoretti and Mathare. Dagoretti, 
a peri-urban area that was formerly part of Kiambu District, is represented in 
5. Kibera is an old settlement in the southern part of the City, where 
Sudanese ex-soldiers were given grants of land by the army after World War 1. 
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e 
Parliament by the influential Minister for Foreign Affairs. After Dagoretti 
was brought into the City in 1964, the people resisted the application of 
City building by-laws on the grounds that the land was freehold and the by-
laws were inappropriate in this semi-rural area. The City has applied Grade 
II by-laws to Dagoretti and planning control is gradually being extended over 
the area. Mathare, on the other hand, was subject to periodic demolitions 
until 1971 when the whole string of villages was "improved" with roads, / 
street-lighting, water and sanitary facilities, following an outbreak of 
cholera elsewhere in Nairobi. Although there are still occasional crackdowns 
on the brewing of illegal liquor (chang'aa) in the valley, the City does not 
demolish unless it is called in by the Administration when new structures 
are built. As a result of these policies, the growth of illegal housing in 
Nairobi has been contained, if by no means completely controlled. But with 
few services being extended to existing squatter areas, the effect of this 
containment is that more and more overcrowding takes place in increasingly 
unhealthy conditions. 
The second dimension of urban policy bias in Kenya is the dis-
proportionate share taken by Nairobi in physical development. While, as we 
have s en, the 1970-74 Development Plan sought to spread development more 
evenly among other urban "growth centres", this has not happened. In fact 
the statistics presented in Table II show the reverse trend. From 1967 
through 1971, Nairobi increased its share of the value of new private construc-
tion in urban areas from 78.3% of the total to 88.7%; while Mombasa's share 
declined from 14.7% to 9.8% and that of the "other main towns" from 7.0% to 
only 1.5%. Although similar statistics are not available for public building, 
they would probably show the same trend; in any case, public building in i 
Kenya's urban areas represented only 15% of all building in 1971. (23, p.124) 
Table II: Completion of buildings for private ownership in main towns, 
1967 - 1971, in K£ '000 
1967 
Value % 
1968 
Value % 
1969 
Value % 
1970 
Value % 
1971 
Value % 
Nairobi 3,145 78. 3 3,631 65. 2 5,867 82.7 8,241 84 5 10,808 88. 7 
Mombasa 590 14. 7 1,304 23. 4 1,003 14.1 1,243 12 7 1,190 9. 8 
Other main 
towns 282 7. 0 633 11. 4 225 3.2 273 2 8 178 1. 5 
Total 4,017 100. 0 5,568 100. 0 7,095 100.0 9,757 100 0 12,176 100. 0 
6. Original I.D.S. Working Paper produced 1974 : editor. 
IDS/DP 232 
A reflection of Nairobi's disproportionate share in national urban 
development is the slow rate of growth of trade and employment in other towns. 
In the case of Kisumu, Kenya's fourth largest city, the recent Africanisation 
of the central business district has caused such a fall in trade that a local 
reporter for a major newspaper referred to it as a "a dying town".(33) 
Nairobi's share in total earnings, as shown in Table III, is considerably larger 
than its share of the total population in the main towns. Moreover, Nairobi's 
share of total earnings went up from 70.0% to 71.5% between 1968 and 1971, 
while the share of almost every other "growth centre" fell or remained the 
same during this period. Meanwhile, Nairobi develops as a centre of inter-
national business and tourism, its most recent new building the Kenyatta 
Conference Centre, which cost the Government £4 million to build. When Kenya 
celebrated her 10th anniversary of Independence in December, 1973, Nairobi's 
imposing skyline was prominently displayed in newsreels and on television as 
a symbol of the country's progress. 
Table III: Reported earnings in main towns of Kenya compared with population 
in'1969. 
Reported Reported 
Town 1969 
Population % 
Earnings 
1968 
Total 
(K£'000) 
-ii' i" 
% 
Earnings 1 H i 
Total 
(K£'000) 
% 
Nairobi 509,286 57.0 73,053 70.0 88,160 71.5 
Mombasa 247,073 27.7 18,542 17.8 20,844 16.9 
Nakuru 47,151 5.3 4,091 3.9 4,555 3.7 
Kisumu 32,431 3.6 3,521 3.4 3,819 3.1 
Thika 18,387 2.1 1,317 1.3 1,739 1.4 
Eldoret 18,196 2.0 2,165 2.1 2,376 1.9 
Nyeri 10,004 1.1 1,254 1.2 1,328 1.1 
Kakamega 6,244 .7 251 .2 260 .2 
Embu 3,928 .4 201 .2 229 .2 
Total 892,700 99.9 104,395 100.1 123,310 100.0 
Sources: (23) p.223; and (19) p.2. 
URBAN POLICY AND PERFORMANCE IN TANZANIA 
Policy 
Like Kenya, Tanzania had, until the late sixties, a patchwork of 
policies to deal with her growing urban problems. As in many other African 
countries, private construction in mainland Tanzania fell off sharply at 
Independence; although it was more than offset by Government investment, as 
Table IV shows, it never regained its former level. 
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Table IV: Value of urban building in mainland Tanzania, 1960 - 1969 (T£'000)a 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Government ^  1480 1430 1195 1400 2015 1275 1295 4380 
Private: 
Dar es Salaam 1510 725 1370 890 1160 1230 1395 1310 975 1335 
Other towns 9 80 845 475 595 695 360 340 920 470 680 
Total 3970 3000 3040 2885 3750 3505 2740 6405 
Residential and non-residential buildings lumped together, 
b 
Excludes buildings erected by National Housing Corporation. 
Source: (55) p.137. 
Meanwhile, the African population was growing rapidly. While the .i 
African population of Dar es Salaam had grown at an average rate of 9% per 
annum from 1948 to 1957 (40), this rate shot up to 14% between the 1957 
and 1967 censuses,(50, p.164) High rates of growth, especially for the African 
(and predominantly lower income) population, were also notable for a number 
of other smaller towns.(51, pp.13-14) 
Until the Arusha Declaration in 1967, Tanzania pursued two main 
strategies to alleviate the pressure for housing and urban community services: 
7 
a building strategy and a land control strategy. The building strategy began 
with the formation of the National Housing Corporation in 1962. The Corporation 
was given a very broad mandate "for the provision of houses and other buildings 
in Tanganyika by means of financial assistance and otherwise". (44) After 
taking over 4,389 low-cost houses (1,690 in Dar es Salaam and 2,699 in other 
towns) that had been built by the colonial government and administered by local 
authorities, the Corporation made "a heroic attempt to seriously cope with g 
the housing problem." The first major programme, concentrating in Dar es Salaam 
on the initiative of President Nyerere, involved clearing some of the old 
"slums" on the periphery of the central business district (in Magomeni 
especially) and replacing them with new, single storey houses which were rented 
out to the previous house-owners. During the first Plan period, from 1964 
to 1969, about 70% of the 5,705 "low-cost" houses built by the corporation 
7. A useful review of urban development policy in mainland Tanzania 
is contained in a Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development publica-
tion. C47) 
8. The phrase is taken from (.1) p. 186. 
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9 came under the Dar es Salaam slum clearance scheme. Although just what 
constitute a "low-cost" house has never been clearly defined either for or 
by the NHC, almost all of the Corporation's efforts have focused" on this 
category of housing. During the First Plan period, the Corporation received 
some £3.47 million from the Government, and was able to raise an additional 
£970,000 from the Federal Republic of Germany, which also gave technical aid 
to the Corporation. The total, £4.44 million, was only about 25% of the targeted 
figure in the Plan, most of the shortfall resulting from the NHC's failure to 
i attract more overseas capital. 
The second major approach to urban development throughout the 
sixties was the control and allocation of land through the Lands Division. 
Under a series of Acts beginning in 1963^, all freehold land was converted 
to Government leasehold, previous owners obliged to pay rent to the Government, 
and development conditions laid down for the use of all urban land. In 
practice, the development conditions are agreed between the Town Planning 
Division and the Lands Division. The zoning policy of the Colonial Government 
which divided residential urban land into low- , medium - and high-density 
areas was continued, but the emphasis in plot allocation and the provision of 
services was shifted from the low-density (i.e. former European) areas to the 
high-density Clow-income African) areas. In recent years, the Lands Division 
has prepared for allocation to the public some 6 - 7,000 plots per year, most 
of them in high density urban areas. The bulk of the high-density plots are 
given out with year-to-year rights of occupancy. This allows the occupant, 
upon payment of a "premium" down and an annual land rent, to build a "temporary 
structure" using traditional materials for building. For more permanent tenure 
in high-density areas, the occupier must pay a higher premium and land rent 
and satisfy higher development conditions, involving in turn significantly 
higher building expenses. Before any new urban area is laid out for such 
development , it is the practice in Tanzania to fully compensate the people 
living in the area - whether or not they have legal claims - for the value 
of their crops and buildings. Only after the area has been compensated and 
cleared for surveying can it be developed. At this point the funds and 
responsibility for the services that must be laid in (water, roads, sewerage 
or septic tanks, community facilities, etc.) are shared among a number of 
different Government divisions and parastatal organisations. 
9. For an evaluation of this scheme, see (10). 
10. This legislation is discussed in detail in (47) pp.14-17 and (13). /
 1 • 
% 
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With the advent of the Arusha Declaration in 1967, proclaiming the 
primacy of socialist rural development, new emphases began to appear in Tanzania's 
urban policy. The Second Five Year Plan, 1969-1974 (54) announced three new 
directions. First, moves were to be taken to decentralize certain government 
fuctions, and to locate new industries, where possible, away from Dar es Salaam. 
Eight towns around the country were selected for "concentrated urban development" 
over the Plan period.^ Second, in order to minimize resources devoted to urban 
development and to maximize the spread of benefits to all classes of urban dwellers, 
the NHC. was to increase its rate of house construction and at the same time to 
limit itself to houses in the cost range of from £300 to £550 per unit. (54, p.191) 
Medium cost houses would be financed either privately or through the Permanent 
Housing Finance Corporation (PHFC), which lent at commercial rates of interest. For 
the bottom end of the income scale , the NHC and the Ministry of Lands, Housing and 
Urban Development (formed in 1968 to unite most of the urban specialist divisions) 
were to develop a programme for the provision of some 5,000 site" and service plots 
per year. The plots were to be equipped with water, drainage and foundations. The 
Plan projected that the public sector would provide from 35,000 to 40,000 houses 
and housing sites over the five year period. For reasons which we shall discuss in 
the next section, nothing close to this figure was achieved. 
The next major urban policy initiative came in April, 1971 with the Govern-
ment's announcement that it was taking over all rental buildings with a value of 
12 
£5,000 and over. An Office of the Registrar of Buildings was created to administer 
the 2900 buildings acquired, whose estimated value was about £32.5 million. (47, p.54) 
While the acquisitions were justified as a logical outcome of the country's socialism, 
most of those who lost their houses and buildings were members of the Asian community. 
In any case, compensation was promised, landlords were permitted to continue to 
occupy flats where they had been living, and tenants in acquired premises simply sent 
their monthly rent cheques to the Registrar of Buildings rather than the former land-
lord. Arrangements whereby the owners would be compensated were announced in 1973. 
(Daily News, 14 February 1973). 
But the problem of wealthy urban landlords was just the tip of the iceberg. 
Already, interministerial discussions had begun in June, 1970 over the whole question 
of a more comprehensive housing policy and in particular the rents paid 
by lower income groups. While the Rent Restriction Act of 
11. These towns were Tanga, Arusha/Moshi, Mwanza, Mtwara, Mbeya, Morogoro, 
Dodoma and Tabora. (See 54, p.181) 
12. The Acquisition of Buildings Act, 1971 applied to all buildings valued at 
shs.100,000/- or renting for shs, 833/- per month or more. Lists of the buildings 
and their owners were published in the newspapers. Because of mistakes, or success-
ful applications to an appeals tribunal, about 300 of the original total had been 
returned to their original owners by 19 73-
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While the Second Plan considered that "the absolute achievement of 
the National Housing Coroporation had been very considerable" it had to admit 
that the net addition to the housing stock of less than 400 units per year 
"just touched the fringe of the housing problem'." (54, p. 189) But even when 
slum clearance was halted in the late sixties, the Corporation found it increasingly 
difficult to obtain funds. While the NHC does some building for other parastatals 
and has also built for the middle-income market through loans from the PHFC (now 
the Tanzania Housing Bank), the bulk of its work is in low-cost housing, 
financed directly by no-interest Treasury grants. These grants have diminished 
considerably in the last few years3 as shown in Table V. 
Table V: Tanzania central government development grants to National Housing 
Corporation for low-cost housing, 1964/5 to 1973/4 
Year Grant (T£) 
1964/5 800,000 
1965/66 350,000 
1966/67 622,000 
1967/68 672,000 
1968/69 662,000 
1969/70 800,000 
1970/71 1,070,000 
1971/72 510,000 
1972/73 125,000 
1973/74 125,000 
This diminution in funds for the NHC is a reflection of a number 
of factors: (.A) Treasury's dissatisfaction over poor financial controls 
and rent collection; (B) the corporation's failure to keep costs low enough 
(in 1973 the average low-cost house cost £920, compared with the Second Plan 
ceiling of £550 per house); and (C) new development priorities which have 
reduced the funds available for urban areas since the Second Plan was accepted. 
With regard to (C)3 specific mention should be made of the TANU Biennial 
Conference in 1971 which emphasized the need to develop water, health and 
educational facilities in the rural areas. Against a targeted figure of 
2,000 houses per year, the NHC was able to build only 138 low-cost units 
throughout the country in 1972/73 or about 7% of its original goal. 
In terms of numbers of plots produced, the surveyed plot allocation 
programme of the Lands Division has been much more successful. Thus, in 1971 
the Division issued 7,305 new short-term rights of occupancy in urban areas, 
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and in 1972 the figure was 6,331. This was still far too small to cope with 
demand, though; for Dar es Salaam alone, the waiting list for high-density 
plots stood at 15,000 at the end of 1972. In spite of direct Presidential 
pressure to speed up allocation, the procedure remained cumbersome and 
expensive. -A. lot of money must be paid to compensate squatters and other 
interests before land can be cleared for surveying; and once surveyed plots 
are made available, services (such as roads, water, schools) are rarely ready 
for the plot allottees, with the result that little controlled building takes 
place and squatters often move back to the land. 
Similar to the plot allocation programme but with higher standards 
of services provided was the sites and services programme. While the 
Second Five Year Plan called for 5,000 serviced sites per year, by the end 
of the Plan's third year only 79 5 had been made available, all of them in a 
single area of Dar es Salaam. A recent evaluation succinctly describes the 
problem: 
An experimental project was initiated in 1970 at Kijitonyama 
in Dar es Salaam. Concrete slabs for 79 5 foundations were 
provided by NHC along with some 60 core houses. Average cost 
of slabs and core houses at shs. 2,350/- plus high standards of 
infrastructure (approximately shs. 7,000/- per plot) put the 
project beyond the reach of most low income families. The 
Government was therefore obliged to heavily subsidize the 
project in order that low income families could be settled on 
the plots and still repay loans for building materials. (4-8, p.9) 
The Sites and Services Directorate in the Ministry of Lands, Housing and 
Urban Development has applied to the World Bank for a loan to cover a 5 - year 
programme of 18,250 plots in Dar es Salaam, Mwanza and Mbeya, but it will be 
some time before this initiative materializes. 
In the face of inadequate public programmes to meet their needs, 
lower income groups have had little alternative to large-scale squatting. 
For Dar es Salaam, a comprehensive delineation of squatter areas was carried 
out for 1969, showing some 14,720 squatter houses within the statutory planning 
16 
area (which goes somewhat beyond the statutory boundaries of the City). 
Using similar methods, another count was carried out for 1972, in this case 
showing some 27,981 squatter houses in the same area - an average compound 
yearly increase of 24% over three years. (39, p.7) Assuming only a 4% annual 
16. Delineation and counting was done with 1969 air photographs of the 
City. Since squatter houses in Dar es Salaam are almost invariably of a 
certain type, and are sited in areas without regular road access, it is simple 
to locate and count them using photo blow-ups. Details of the exercise are 
contained in (25). 
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growth in the non-squatter areas during this period, and on the basis of a 
small survey of the population density of squatter areas, it was estimated 
that in 1972 about 4-4-% of the total population of the total population of greater 
Dar es Salaam lived in squatter areas. (39, p.8) In the light of public 
recognition that the successful implementation of the 196 8 Dar es Salaam Master 
Plan would "hinge to a large extent on the degree of control exercised over 
squatters, (49, p.106) the efficacy of planning in the capital city roust be 
seriously questioned. But as long as low-cost NHC building, plot allocations 
and the sites and services programme do not provide for the net migration to 
the city3 squatting will offer both a necessary and a rational response to 
the accommodation problem. This is not entirely a bad thing - rents in 
squatter houses are lower than in conventional houses, and squatter areas are 
often conveniently located for places of work - but facilities in these areas 
are genuinely poor and the environment is often very unhealthy, especially in 
the rainy seasons. Removal of major squatting areas is politically impossible 
in Tanzania, and to improve them by putting in roads, water and drainage is a 
costly and laborious exercise. 
^ When the Acquisition of Buildings Bill was rushed through Parliament 
in April 1971, the Minister observed that, while the Government had already 
nationalized big industries, banks, insurance companies and wholesale and 
retail trade, 
u the opportunity still remains for exploiters to 
get high rents on large buildings in the cities. This 
strategy enhances privilege especially in urban areas. 
This new revolutionary law, if passed by Parliament, will 
wipe away this opportunity and overthrow privilege and 
exploitation. (46 col,23)x 
It was not entirely a coincidence that most of these buildings were owned by 
Asians: the Asian community still controls the private commercial sector in 
Tanzania. Although the Act was not manifestly racist, the acquisitions 
resulted in many thousands of Asian families leaving the country and a great 
fall in private building. Most private construction firms wwere wiped out, 
since they had invested their profits in buildings and were using rents for 
working capital. While no new housing was created, it will be some time 
before this drop in construction capacity is redressed. 
As for the new income-based rental policy announced by the Govern-
ment in early 1973, it is worth noting that it only applied to civil servants 
and parastatal employees living in Government, parastatal or NHC housing. 
17. The passage is translated from the original Kiswahili. 
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Totally unaffected by the measure are almost all lower-income urban workers, 
and the bulk of middle-income clerks and administrators who have to find 
their own housing, often in the squatter areas. Meanwhile, these middle-
and upper-income civil servants who came under the new regulations tended to 
feel they were unfair, since while prices were steadily rising their incomes 
were not, and the new rents generally meant higher payments. 
A final aspect of Tanzanian urban policy that can be evaluated is 
the strategy of deconcentration outside of Dar es Salaam. As far as I have 
been able to learn, no administrative machinery was ever set up to influence 
the siting of new industries to the eight "growth towns". Thus, of the 
approximately thirty major new industries set up in the two years after the 
inception of the urban decentralization plan, only ten went outside Dar es 
Salaam, and seven of these ten went to Arusha/Moshi. "Therefore only 3 of 
the 30 industries were shared by the 7 least industrialized growth towns." 
(42, p.103) The deconcentration of administrative functions has been more 
successful. Under the new Regional Development Directors appointed in 1972, 
significant town planning, surveying and land allocation functions are now 
undertaken in the Regions. While there is a critical shortage of staff at 
this level, the situation is improving, and for the financial year 1973/74, 
annual budgets were drawn up by the Regions themselves in cooperation.with 
the Prime Minister's Office. The decision to move the capital to Dodoma will 
certainly give an impetus to the decentralization effort. 
KENYA AND TANZANIA: URBAN POLICY COMPARED 
As the foregoing analysis of urban policy and performance has 
illustrated, there are some broad similarities but also some crucial differences 
between the two neighbouring countries. While the similarities illustrate 
approaches and problems shared by many other African countries, the differences 
stem largely from divergent social and political parameters to the policy 
process. After a brief discussion of two main areas of convergence, we will 
discuss the general context of the policy divergencies. 
Convergence 
Growth of the Centre: In both countries, as we have seen, a dis-
proportionate amount of industrial development has been sited in the capital 
city, despite official intentions to the contrary. Thus in 1970 Dar es Salaam 
had 46.0% of the total recorded urban employment in Tanzania, up from 44.2% 
the previous year. (56, p.37) In 1971, Nairobi had 55.0% of all enumerated 
in the main towns, up from 53.8% a year earlier. (.23, p.216) The most recent 
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statistics thus show that the employment share of the largest cities is growing. 
But employment dominance is clearly linked to population, a factor which 
is almost impossible for governments to influence by deliberate policy. 
According to the most recent census returns, Dar es Salaam in 1967 had 45.2% 
of the total urban population in towns over 10,000 in Tanzania, while Nairobi 
had 54.9% of Kenya's urban population. Given exceptionally high growth rates 
in the two cities, there is no reason to assume these proportions are declining 
Weakness of Policies Aimed at Lower Income Groups: Both Kenya and 
Tanzania have officially committed the bulk of public housing funds to low 
income groups. But in both countries (though to a much greater extent in Kenya) 
the efforts of the National Housing Corporations have been biased in favour 
of middle-income groups for conventional housing. Substantial sites and services 
programmes have failed to materialize. The Housing Corporations in these two 
countries are among the most dynamic in Africa, but their failure to provide 
adequately for low income groups is consistent with experience elsewhere on 
18 
the continent. If Kenya has made some important changes in the direction 
of relaxing municipal by-laws to permit lower-standard development (Tanzania 
has not yet amended its 1956 building code.), the overall effect of regulatory 
action - at least in Nairobi - is to preclude low-income groups from conventional, 
permanent housing, and to heavily bias the provision of services to authorized 
rather than unauthorized areas. In both countries urban squatter populations 
have been growing more rapidly than the population in the authorized, planned 
areas. * 
Divergence 
Beneath these broad similarities, a close comparison of urban policy 
in Kenya and Tanzania shows some extremely- important differences. In general, 
Tanzanian urban policy in recent years has been more innovative than urban 
policy in Kenya, and the total effect of policy in Tanzania has been to direct 
attention toward a significantly lower income level of the population than 
is the case In Kenya. The first point deals with the content of policy, while 
the second deals with its impact. 
Urban policy has been more innovative In Tanzania in terms of the 
large number of major decisions taken in recent years to alter the distribution 
of benefits to major groups both within urban areas and rural areas. These 
18. For Ghana, see (9) and for Western Nigeria see (34). The kinds of 
corruption and mismanagement brought out in these West African case studies 
do not, however, appear to apply to Kenya and Tanzania. 
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decisions have been detailed in the section 'Urban Policy and Performance in 
Tanzania' above, but the most important among them include the active develop-
ment of a national sites and services programme through the establishment of 
a Sits and Services Directorate, the de facto: recognition of existing 
squatter settlements and the intention to gradually improve services to them, 
a new civil servant rental policy related to income, the establishment of 
the new Tanzania Housing Bank, and the decision to move the capital away from 
Dar es Salaam to one of the least developed regions of the country. With 
one exception, policy in Kenya has tended to consolidate earlier decisions 
and urban patterns and no new institutions have been created. The important 
exception was the passing of the Local Government Adoptive (Grade II) Bylaws 
in 1968. What looked like another major exception was the central government's 
decision to allocate, beginning in 1968, 50% of the GPT collections from 
Nairobi and Mombasa for redistribution to poorer local authorities. But there 
is no evidence that Treasury actually used the funds for this purpose, and 
in any case the remissions were stopped in 1971, GPT being abolished altogether 
in 1974. 
Policy innovation, however, is meaningless in the absence of effec-
tive implementation. While Tanzania has pushed very far to draw out the urban 
policy implications of an ideology which stresses rural socialist development, 
it has paid less attention to strengthening the bureaucratic machinery necessary 
to carry out the new policies. It is true that local government in Tanzania 
has a much shorter history than in Kenya; but local authorities in Tanzania 
19 
have been much weaker as well. For example, urban and district councils m 
Tanzania employed 28,971 in 1968, as against 63,100 in Kenya in the same year. 
(See 55, p.174 and 23, p.21!) At the end of 1973, the Dar es Salaam City 
Council was officially disbanded, its functions being taken over by the Dar es 
Salaam Regional Development Director, and below him three district development 
committees each covering a part of the greater Dar es Salaam area. It is too 
early to evaluate how this arrangement will work in practice, but well before 
this decision was taken the City Council had shown itself to be a relatively 
ineffective organization. In relation to Kenya cities, the expenditures of the 
Dar es Salaam City Council have been modest. In 1969, for example, for an 
estimated population of 316,453, the Council spent £1,525 million. (55, pp.152-
153) This amounted to an expenditure of Shs. 96/- per person. In the same 
year the Nairobi City Council spent Shs 354/- per person (3.7 times as much) 
and the Mombasa Municipal Council spent Shs 162/- per person (1.7 times as much). 
19. An excellent analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of local govern-
ment in Tanzania is contained in (35). 
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While there have been challenges to their autonomy, municipal councils in 
Kenya, during the period under review, were much stronger institutions and 
undertook significantly more functions on their own than their counterparts 
in Tanzania. 
This weakness of local councils in Tanzania, and in particular the 
Dar es Salaam Council, has meant that various central government departments 
have b een responsible for carrying out almost all the more recent urban policy 
decisions. The Dar es Salaam City Council had, for example, only one 
professional town planner on its staff in 1973. This meant that virtually 
all the detailed planning for the capital city was done in the offices of the 
Town Planning Division of the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development. 
In 1971 the Division had only six professional staff with responsibility for 
the whole country. (47, p.30) By contrast, the Government Town Planning 
Department in Kenya had 14 professional staff in 1971, while the Town Planning 
Office of the Nairobi City Council had in addition at least half that number. 
Kenya has its own problems of coordinating urban development, but these problems 
are less intractable because of the relatively higher level of professional 
capacity, and because a great deal of the planning and phasing of programmes 
is worked out within the major councils. In Tanzania, where very little project 
planning takes place within, or uses the services of the urban councils, inter-
and intra-ministerial conflicts can have a much more serious impact. In Kenya, 
the stability and continuity of Government institutions tends to be seen as 
an end in itself; in Tanzania, institutional structures are often changed to 
achieve consistency with evolving development goals. 
While it is valid to characterize Tanzania's overriding objective 
as "socialist rural development", it is not so easy to pithily summarize Kenya's 
development goals in a simple shorthand phrase. Side by side with a. framework 
of rather extensive controls over and government participation in certain sectors 
of the economy (e.g. agriculture and tourism), there is a vigorous private 
sector bounded only by the injunction that it Africanize its personnel as 
rapidly as possible. These differing development emphases lead to a different 
bias in urban policy, despite common problems of performance. In Tanzania, 
the bulk of Government activity and development funds for the urban areas are 
intended to benefit "workers" or "lower income groups"; at the same time, care 
is taken that co-operative, socialist activities are promoted and that the gap 
20 between urban workers and rural peasants does not widen. In Kenya, where we 
20. For an important analysis of the income gap between urban and rural 
areas, see the Turner Report (52); the report was discussed at length in Parliament, 
(45, cols. 2581-2666) For a concise statement of Government policy on incomes and 
the rural-urban balance, see (54) pp.205-207. 
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have seen how some programmes at least ostensibly aim at the lower income 
groups, other programmes - notably the building of municipal markets, loan 
support for the Africanization of trade, numerous housing estates built with 
public funds, the lending policies of the commercial banks - tend to benefit 
mainly those with property or capital. 
These differences in urban policy are related to a number of more 
general independent differences between the two countries. Foremost among 
these are political structures and attitudes, and income distribution. We 
will discuss each of these factors in turn. 
Political Structures and Attitudes: The first important variable 
here is political party organization. The single party in Tanzania, TANU, 
is a mass organization, from the local ten-house cell leaders covering all 
the urban and most of the rural areas, to an ongoing national headquarters 
and executive structure. Technical economic decisions are first passed by 
the Economic Committee of the Cabinet after extensive scrutiny by the civil 
service, but the National Executive Committee of the party meets regularly 
with the President and most, if not all important decisions:are taken with 
its sanction. While the party has been concerned about its role in implementing 
21 
development policy its importance in setting general policy goals is un-
questioned. In Kenya, the ruling party, KANU, has played virtually no role 
in any major recent policy decision. Party headquarters amount to little more 
than a few offices; at district level party branches play essentially a nomina-
tion role at election time. Thus, while the continued vitality of the mass 
party in Tanzania obliges policy makers to take the needs of the poorest areas 
and lowest income groups into consideration, the same kind of institutional 
pressure does not exist in Kenya. This does not mean that there is no concern 
for the needs of these groups in Kenya; far from it. But in most squatter 
communities in Nairobi, the people seem to feel that they have little influence 
over the vagaries of the political process; in Tanzania, on the other hand, 
TANU is effectively orgahiied in all:squatter communities and the people in these 
are&S' have1'effectively ::insulated themselves'against Government demolitxbn andt 
restrictions hy using their party representatives. 'The evidence suggests 
that the influence of. individual MP's in protecting low-income communities in Kenya 
21. For example, paragraph 11 of the TANU Guidelines, 1971 0*1) stated, "The 
responsibility of the Party is to lead the masses, and their various institutions, 
in the effort to safeguard national independence and to advance the liberation of 
the African. The duty of a socialist party is to guide all activities of the masses. 
The Government, parastatals, national organisations, etc., are instruments for imple-
menting the Party's policies. Our short history of independence reveals problems 
that may arise when a party does not guide its instruments. The time has now come for 
the Party to take the reins and lead all the people's activities." The Guidelines are 
translated into English in (.28). 
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is not comparable. 
The degree to which lower-income urban needs are or are not effec-
tively articulated through the political machinery is partly a reflection of 
the attitudes and interests of the political-administrative elite. The 
prevailing attitude toward urban development in Tanzania was well expressed 
in the 1967 Arusha Declaration, first written in draft by President Nyerere 
and published in amended form by the TANU National Executive Committee: 
...We must not forget that people who live in towns can 
possibly become the exploiters of those who live in the 
rural areas. All our big hospitals are in towns and they 
benefit only a small section of the people of Tanzania. 
Yet if we have built them with loans from outside Tanzania, 
it is the overseas sale of the peasants' produce which 
provides the foreign exchange for repayment. Those who do 
not get the benefit of the hospitals thus carry the major 
responsibility for paying for them. Tarmac roads, too, 
are mostly found in towns and are of especial value to 
the motor-car owners. Yet if we have built these roads 
with loans, it is again the farmer who produces the goods 
which will pay for them. What is more, the foreign ex-
change with which the car was bought also came from the 
sale of the farmers' produce. Again, electric lights, 
water pipes, hotels and other aspects of modern develop-
ment are mostly found in towns. Most of them have been 
built with loans and most of them do not benefit the 
farmer directly, although they will be paid for by the 
foreign exchange earned by the sale of his produce. We 
should always bear this in mind. (31, pp. 24-2-24-3) 
Later in the same document, a leadership code was proposed whereby TANU leaders 
and higher Government officials were prohibited from owning shares or director-
ships In any private company, receiving more than a single salary, or owning 
houses for rent. (31, p.249) This leadership code has on the whole been 
successfully enforced. In effect, the code separates the interests of party 
and Government officials from specifically urban-based enterprise, since there 
is no restriction on a leader developing his rural farm, so long as he is not 
"associated with the practices of capitalism or feudalism." This anti-urban 
bias is in turn partially a reflection of the fact that few, if any,of the 
top political leaders of the country represent towns or areas adjacent to the 
capital. If TANU's development as an effective nationalist party out of 
associations that "were essentially rurally based" and "the resentment of 
country people against outside interference" (5, p.22) is a valid interpreta-
tion for the pre-Independence period, the government that TANU formed later has 
been no less rural in its predispositions. 
22. This conclusion emerges from a case study of the demolition of a 
squatter village in Mombasa. See C38) Chapter 7. 
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Kenya political leaders have been less explicit on the rural-urban 
development distinction. Besides a formal commitment to rural development 
in the Second Five Year Plan, there is President Kenyatta's frequent "back to 
the land" exhortation with the related implication that urban areas are 
breeding grounds of immorality and crime. In 1972 a speech by the President 
was reported as follows: 
Vagrants and idlers in Nairobi and other towns through-
out Kenya were yesterday reminded by President Kenyatta 
of his call to "go back to the land" to help the farming 
community continue developing the country.... "Our 
country has no place for lazy and idle people", he said.... 
"Those who believe in hanging around Nairobi and other 
towns must heed my call of 'go back to the land'. It is 
only when we have got rid of vagrants and idlers that we 
can eradicate robbery and thefts," the President said. 
(East African Standard, 28 September, 1972) 
Later the same year, in justifying the demolition of some shanties along the 
Nairobi River, the Nairobi Provincial Commissioner : 
... said shanties were harbouring hundreds of criminals. 
Many of them are often responsible for pick-pocketing 
incidents and night-time robberies, he alleged. 
The PC warned that the law would not tolerate such 
activities and war had been declared to deal with such 
culprits, he said. The shanty dwellers were unwanted as 
the structures they had were illegal and a danger to the 
peaceful and low-abiding citizens of the city. 
Mr. Mburu said all those living in the shanties had 
their homes, and even land, back in the reserves but did 
not wish to stay there. "The Government, therefore, has 
not alternative but to take them back to their homes," 
he said. (Daily Nation, 1 December, 1972) 
Persistence of these attitudes toward squatters and the urban un-
employed notwithstanding, the Government has maintained its financial support 
for urban development. Funds advanced to Kenya's National Housing Corporation 
have been significantly greater than to its Tanzania counterpart: in 1972, for 
example, the Kenya Government' loaned the NHC £1.793 million (17, p.37) for 
the financial year 1972/73. Tanzania's NHC received only £125,000, or about 
7% of the Kenya total. At the same time, as we have seen, urban local authorities 
in Kenya have spent at a much higher level than in Tanzania. These differences 
cannot be explained in terms of different overall levels of expenditure by the 
two Governments, since in recent years total recurrent and development expenditures 
in the two countries have been roughly equal. Even the slightly higher level 
of urbanization in Kenya does not account for the differences. Of course, a lot 
more income is generated in Kenya's cities because of the wealth of the Asian 
and expatriate communities living there, particularly in Nairobi, but this in 
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itself does not explain why the Government of Kenya has spent so much more 
on public housing and other services which benefit the African community. 
A major reason, I would submit, is political. Unlike the Tanzanian example, 
many influential Cabinet Ministers (including the President himself) come from 
areas in Central Province within commuting distance of Nairobi. Not only have 
many of their constituents migrated to Nairobi for work, maintaining their 
plots (shambas) and continuing to contribute to family up-keep and self-help 
projects in their home areas, but many senior politicians themselves have 
become heavily involved in urban land and businesses. This urban involve-
i. nt, at a somewhat lower level, applies also to civil servants in both 
central and local Government, though it appears to be more prevalent among 
Kikuyu who are the majority ethnic group in Nairobi and the main group in 
23 
the adjacent Central Province. Politicians and high-level administrators 
have invested in land, buildings and businesses in other Kenya towns as well, 
though to a much lesser extent than in Nairobi. When this involvement is not 
direct it may take place through relatives. Government support for a relatively 
high level of urban services, and in particular for the prestige development of 
Nairobi^is unlikely to diminish so long as these interests are congruent. 
Income Distribution: A second, and complementary dimension which 
helps to account for the greater ideological thrust toward lower-income 
benefits in Tanzania is related to class structure. Without getting into a 
24 
detailed discussion of the attributes of class in urban African society, 
suffice it to say that any analysis in depth must take as a starting point 
the known data on income distribution. While it is not easy to achieve perfect 
comparability, some survey data fortunately exist for the main urban areas in 
both countries. These are presented in Tables'TI and VII. The data for Kenya 
Table VI: Households by income class for Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu, 1968-69 
sample survey 
Income 
(Shs. / Month 
No. of Households 
Totals 
Source: (12) p. 346. Table 53. 
Cumulative % 
23. For a brilliant analysis of urban-rural ties that applies particularly 
to Central Province,see (26). 
24. 
in (4). 
An excellent recent collection of articles on class in Africa is contained 
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is based on a household survey in 1968-69 and includes all main forms of cash 
and non-cash income. 
The data for Tanzania, on the other hand, is based on a random survey 
of individuals in 1971, and does not include non—cash income. Admittedly, 
Table VII: Individuals' total_cash income by income class for Dar es Salaam, 
Tanga, Mwanza and Arusha, 1971." ' ' ~ 
Income 
(Shs. / Month) No. of Respondents % Cumulative % 
0 - 199 654 30.6 30.6 
200 - 299 611 28.6 59.2 
300 - 399 332 15.5 74.7 
400 - 499 / 121 5.6 80.3 
500 - 749 191 8.9 89.2 
750 - 999 49 2.3 91.5 
1000 - 1499 83 3.9 95.4 
Over 1500 99 4.6 100.0 
Totals 2140 100.0 
Source: Author's computation of data supplied by R. Sabot and M. Bienefeld. 
C3 ) 
these data are not perfectly comparable. The Kenya table refers to households 
and includes non-cash income; the Tanzania data refers to all income-earning 
individuals and is derived from a survey carried out two years later. The time 
difference, however, is an advantage to comparison, since the greater income 
earned by households in the Kenya sample would be to some extent cancelled by 
natural increases in individual incomes over two years in Tanzania. 
For all the problems implicit in such a comparison, the two samples 
show a striking difference in income distribution. The bulk of the Tanzanian 
sample (59.2%) was earning less than shs. 300/- per month, while only 24.2% of 
the Kenyan sample was in this income class. At the other extreme, only 8.5% of 
25. The IL0 report, (12), relies heavily on this survey, but notes "there 
was serious bias in the sample...The major biases arose through omitting most 
of the urban shanty areas from the sample frame and through excluding European 
and Asian households from the sample, thereby also excluding many African house-
hold servants, many of whom earn less than 200 shs. a month." (pp. 75-76). In 
a more recent synthesis of a number of social surveys in Nairobi, however, the 
Nairobi Urban Study group has produced an income distribution table for Nairobi 
in 1972 that shows a much lower proportion of urban households in the below shs 
300/- per month class, and a much higher proportion in the highest income category. 
Even if all of these samples are biased, which is difficult to demonstrate, they 
still represent an income distribution pattern which policy makers must presume 
to exist. 
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the Tanzanian urban workers earned shs. 1,0007- per month or more, in contrast 
to 27.8% of the Kenyan households sampled. In spite of the difficulty of 
comparing the two samples as precisely as we would like, the differences are 
so great that two conclusions are inescapable: a much higher proportion of 
Tanzanian workers receive low incomes; and a much lower proportion of 
Tanzanians receive relatively high incomes. These differences in urban 
income distribution are an important parameter on urban development programmes 
in the two countries. On the one hand, the greater proportion of middle and 
upper-income earners in Kenya (and again, especially Nairobi) puts considerable 
pressure on both local and central government to provide higher standard urban 
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services and facilities. On the other hand, in the Tanzanian urban environ-
ment any policy which does not at least attempt to benefit lower income groups 
will alienate the Government from the overwhelming majority of the population. 
Quite apart from elite interests and political structure, some of the differences 
in urban policy in the two countries are undoubtedly a reflection of contrasting 
urban class structures. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have compared urban policy and performance for the 
post-Independence period ending in 1973.The picture that emerges is of sub-
stantially differing approaches to policy in Kenya and Tanzania, differences 
which are in turn related to broader systemic factors such as overall political 
goals, political structures and income distribution. If this is not surprising, 
in view of what we already know about the differences between the political 
systems of the two countries, there are nevertheless some general points to be 
drawn from this type of comparison. 
First, it is obviously not sufficient to characterize a country's 
policies in a particular area as, say, "progressive" or "consolidative" without 
taking account of the quality of implementation. If a country is poor, and its 
bureaucratic resources are limited, to put too much pressure on the bureaucracy 
to effect change is in the end to invite stagnation and a situation whereby only 
those with access to the bureaucracy and its agencies will get what they need. 
Unless performance is improved, this is a danger " that always lurks beyond 
policy innovation In Tanzania. For regimes where policy change has not been 
radical, and where bureaucratic capacity has been developed to more adequate 
26. For an extensive treatment of upper-income biases in the housing 
programme of the Nairobi City Council, see C57). 
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levels, the problem for policy-makers may be to cope with demands from all 
sections of urban society and not merely to meet targets or to maintain 
services in a formal sense. In a rapidly urbanizing society where the bulk 
of the new migrants are in lower-income groups, Kenya's urban bureaucracy will 
increasingly have to come to terms with the problem of equity. 
The second point concerns political constraints. Urban political 
systems in Africa, with one or two exceptions, are notoriously weak in the 
sense that contact between most of the population and governing institutions 
and bureaucratic agencies is poorly articulated. Tanzania is somewhat of 
an exception to this pattern with the result that urban policy is constrained 
to focus on lower income groups; at the same time, the programmes that have 
resulted are very costly and difficult to carry out, especially in a country 
committed to rural development. In Kenya, where the bureaucracy clearly does 
not operate under the same political constraints, policy has been less 
innovative but performance more consistent over time. The two countries, then, 
represent opposite urban policy dilemmas in the interplay between the twin 
needs for equity and performance. 
IDS/DP 232 
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